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Political Economy and the Study of Britain and European Integration: 
A Global-National Perspective 
 
 
Abstract 
 
An extensive range of evidence and analysis has been employed to 
understand the complex relationship between Britain and the process of 
European integration. This paper builds on a body of work within the study 
of European integration that examines British economic interests in 
European policy making. However, I show that a comprehensive 
explanation of this relationship requires the application of a politico-
economic analysis on national articulations of global and transnational 
processes. It is, I propose, Britain’s distinctive insertion into the global 
economy that enables us to understand and explain Britain’s problematic 
relationship to the processes of European integration. This is explored 
through an analytic narrative of Britain’s historical relationship to the 
process of European integration. From a broad comparative perspective, I 
emphasise the exceptional character of Britain’s globalised political 
economy. 
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Introduction 
 
The broad generalisations that have been typical of much of the 
globalisation literature have faced considerable criticism from comparative 
political economy approaches that re-emphasise national and regional 
specificities (Canoy 1993; Weiss 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1999). 
However, a clear differentiation of national from global levels of analysis is 
not always possible or appropriate. A central argument of this paper is that a 
satisfactory political economy must address, both theoretically and 
empirically, national political orders within a context of transnational and 
global processes. Notably in the case of Britain and Europe, it is impossible 
fully to understand how this relationship has unfolded without exploring 
how national, regional and global processes interpenetrate and overlap. In 
the paper, I therefore set out a framework and narrative that will 
demonstrate how British political economy cannot be studied without 
understanding its relationship to the globalisation of political economic 
development1. The objective is to show how Britain intersects globalisation 
and regionalisation in such a way that a very particular relationship to the 
process of European integration has emerged.  
 
Britain and the political economy of European integration: the limits of 
the nation-state model 
 
In recent years some seminal studies on the political economy of European 
integration have made an important contribution to understanding Britain’s 
distinctive relationship with, and within, the European Union (Milward 
1992; Moravscik 1999). However, the approaches taken in these studies are 
theoretically limited and do not fully address the highly distinctive British 
interpenetration of the global and the national. In this section, I critically 
examine these approaches before going on to show how this limitation can 
be addressed.  
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The economic history set out by Milward in The European Rescue of the 
Nation-State (1992) is highly suggestive about the difficult relationship 
between Britain and the EC/EU (European Community/ European Union). It 
is against a model of national/European politico-economic modernisation 
that Milward evaluates post-war British European policy.  He identified the 
formation of the European Community with the emergence of a common 
state model across Western Europe after the war (Milward 1992: 26).  This 
state was organised in terms of a wider social consensus than had been seen 
in the past, including ‘labour, agricultural producers, and a diffuse alliance 
of lower and middle income beneficiaries of the welfare state’ (ibid: 27).  In 
the case of the European Community, Milward shows that this politico-
economic settlement also redefined the relations between states and secured 
future growth and stability. In contrast, he judges that in Britain the political 
consensus that brought about this reconstruction was absent (ibid: 433). The 
core political institutions of the British state, the Foreign Office and 
Treasury were dominated by an amateurish and socially prejudiced monied 
upper class (ibid: 431). Milward views the more global aspects of the 
British political economy as evidence of a failed European state. In Britain, 
the City dominated economic policy and was a ‘closed social circle 
protected by its own restrictionist politics’ (ibid: 395). It prioritised world 
wide commercial policies such as currency convertibility, which were 
unrealistic and fundamentally at odds with national industrial 
modernisation.  
 
The tone of Milward’s original argument has however shifted in his recent 
‘official history’ of Britain and the European Community between 1945-63 
that draws on a comprehensive study of the public records (2002). Here, the 
world wide policies of the British elites are explained in terms of a  
‘national strategy’ that in the post-war context was entirely rational 
considering Britain’s recent historical role as a world hegemon. In this 
account, Britain’s attempt to push the member-states of the EC in a more 
liberal internationalist direction appear both feasible and possible and not as 
the last stand of a deluded imperial elite (2002: 418-419).  It is ultimately 
thwarted by Britain’s own weaknesses and the USA’s willingness to support 
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a discriminatory European trade bloc. The contention of this paper is that 
when viewed through a different set of conceptual lenses the global 
dimensions of Britian’s ‘national strategy’ are both more continuous and 
more significant than Milward implies. There remains an under theorised 
account of the British ‘national political system’ that underplays its 
distinctiveness from the European state system. The implication is that 
Britain’s problems with the process of European integration have been 
chronic and structural rather than simply tactical and strategic. 
  
A similar problem arises in the case of Moravscik (1999) in his more 
specific analysis of the role of commercial interests in the integration 
process. Moravscik (1999) argues, contra Milward, that British policy at the 
time of the Treaties of Rome was a ‘rational, remarkably flexible, even far-
sighted defense of enduring British economic interests’ (ibid: 123).  The 
distancing of Britain from European integration was justified in terms of the 
analysis of the economic implications of membership made by elites at the 
time (1999: 132). The political preferences and cleavages that emerged over 
the issue of European integration reflected core British economic interests 
and, while there was considerable concern over possible exclusion of 
Britain from a Customs Union, British policy came down on the side of 
these dominant economic interests (1999: 167-176). This meant support for 
Commonwealth trade until it became clear that the balance of British trade 
was significantly shifting towards the European Community (ibid). The 
support of big business for membership during the 1960s and 1970s, and its 
fear of exclusion from the European market, became the overriding factor in 
the minds of British political elites and translated into a consistent pro-
European policy (ibid: 281). Despite longstanding opposition to the 
federalist aspects of integration, British elites have in the final analysis been 
reluctant to allow these concerns to override the possibility of British 
commercial exclusion from Europe. However, the ‘nation-state’ model that 
underpins this approach leads to a highly selective interpretation of 
evidence, particularly in the dismissal of geopolitical interests and 
ideologies. British elites are simply shown to be acting like other national 
elites processing core national economic interests. Notably, Moravscik does 
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not address the extent to which British elites have often represented, both 
strategically and ideologically, the interests of global fractions of capital and 
this has set Britain apart from other European states.  
 
These studies provide significant insights into the causal processes of 
Britain’s political economic relationship to European integration. In 
particular, they provide an important counter to diplomatic histories as they 
direct attention towards social power and economic interests and strategies 
rather than dipomatic high politics (see Moravscik 1999: 87-88). However, 
they are not underpinned by a theoretically informed account of the British 
state and economy. It is only from such a perspective that the historical 
intermeshing of national and global economic strategies that finds 
continuous and contemporaneous expression in British elite practices can be 
fully explained. 
 
 
Britain, Europe and globalisation 
 
Hyperglobalist arguments (inter alia Ohmae 1990) claiming that sweeping 
transnational economic processes have resulted in inexorable state decline 
remain highly contentious. They have not only been criticised by work on 
comparative and regional political economy (Mann 1997; Hirst and 
Thompson 1999) but also by those who have identified the way in which 
processes in the global political economy are intrinsically and 
fundamentally constituted by national states (Poulantzas 1975; Arrighi 
1994; Gowan 1999; Panitch 2000; Barrow 2005).  The latter kinds of 
analyses are central to the arguments of this paper as they show that 
globalisation cannot be abstracted from the actions and policies of capitalist 
states. From this perspective, Britain’s role in globalisation is shown to be  
central but secondary to the United States. In this section I set out this 
argument and show how it is essential to understanding British relations 
with, and within, the EC/EU.  
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The hegemonic role played by the US in post-war Western Europe was 
central to its reconstruction as a successful capitalist region and to its 
security in the Cold War. However, with the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods order in the early 1970s there was a shift in economic relationship 
between the US and Western Europe. At the time, Nicos Poulantzas2 (1975: 
87) noted that the dollar crisis led to a series of withdrawals by the EEC 
over issues of monetary policy and the energy crisis in the face of US 
demands. He argued that in the context of the decline of Bretton Woods, 
Western Europe was more directly penetrated and targeted by US interests. 
This he believed represented an offensive ‘to undermine the place of a 
secondary imperialism that Europe had succeeded in occupying under its 
hegemony’ (ibid: 88 emphasis mine). From this perspective, globalisation 
represented a reorganisation of international capitalist relations under US 
hegemony. Since Poulantzas, commentators have shown how US, and US 
dominated institutions with a global reach have engaged in the restructuring 
of capitalist social relations across regions and countries (see Panitch 2000). 
Gowan, for example, identifies ‘The Dollar-Wall Street Regime’ as the key 
mechanism bringing about this transformation: 
 
The American Government chooses not to seek fixed exchange rates 
with the other main currencies, since that would require the US 
Government to give up its use of the dollar price as an instrument for 
choosing its other goals. Therefore, under the regime, the dollar 
moves in great gyrations up and down against the other currencies, 
utterly transforming their trading and other environments. (1999: 33) 
    
In moves engineered by US governments, the control of the value of 
exchange rates shifted from governments to international private finance. 
The turbulence created by the floating dollar and shifts in US interest rates 
forced increased reliance of states on US-dominated financial institutions. In 
addition, Gowan notes that Britain’s role in this had in fact been established 
by the early 1960s when the City of London became an ‘off-shore’ 
European base for dollars that could be borrowed and deposited by 
governments and businesses throughout the world (ibid: 22). In particular, it 
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allowed US banks to operate outside of US domestic regulations (ibid).  
Moreover, Gowan argues that the City’s openness to the global economy 
was a direct consequence of British government policy (ibid: 38).  
 
The emergence of the Eurodollar market in the City of London is generally 
seen to represent the beginnings of a shift away from nationally regulated 
capitalism and towards the re-establishment of the hegemony of global 
finance (Burn 1999: 226). Burn (1999) has documented exactly how its 
emergence was a consequence of the institutional architecture of British 
political economic governance established in the nineteenth century; the 
City-Bank of England-Treasury nexus. Such analyses locate Britain within 
politically driven processes of globalisation from well before the Thatcher 
and Blair Governments’ espousals of free market principles. This 
proposition is highly suggestive of the role of British political institutions in 
transforming the global economy preceding the breakdown of Bretton 
Woods and contemporary processes of globalisation. However, it is since 
the 1980s that commentators have particularly emphasised the role of 
Britain in ‘globalising’ Europe. Schmitter and Streeck noted that  
‘deregulation thus spread from the United States to Britain, the country with 
the most open capital markets, and from there to the European continent, 
meeting with declining resistance in changing domestic political economies’ 
(1991: 148 emphasis mine). The persistent opposition of British 
governments to a deeper project of European integration can be seen as part 
of an offensive against the emergence of a ‘secondary imperialism’ in 
Europe. From this viewpoint, Britain’s role has been to open up Europe to 
the free movement of capital while at the same time restricting integration 
so the EC/EU does not develop the kind of political and social structures 
that could challenge US hegemony.  
 
To conceive of globalisation as a product of contemporary capitalist state 
relations, enables a number of hypotheses concerning Britain’s relationship 
to European integration to be formed. Firstly, that Britain has had a 
significant global political economic role that is related to its particular 
incorporation within US hegemony as well as to its own political economic 
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heritage. Secondly, the consequence of this has been to turn Britain into a 
vehicle and protagonist for the globalisation of Europe.  The argument of 
this paper is that whilst these propositions are correct they have not been 
properly substantiated because of the focus on the generality of 
globalisation rather than its articulation within particular contexts and 
relations. The following analytic narrative therefore aims to demonstrate 
how globalisation is expressed in the British political economy and how this 
can illuminate Britain’s relationship to the process of European integration. 
A third proposition to be considered is that Britain has successfully pursued 
its global agenda leading to a convergence of the European Union along the 
lines of a neo-liberal British model.  The discussion will also demonstrate 
that the very specificity of Britain’s globalised political economy means it is 
not appropriate to view Britain as a model for other European states and the 
European Union in general.  
 
European integration and the renewal of Britain’s global political 
economy 
 
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the British economy has on a 
range of measures been consistently more internationalised than its major 
competitors (Hirst and Thompson 2000: 340). Indeed Britain was no more 
globalised in the 1990s than it was in the 1890s (ibid). In exploring the 
inter-penetration of the British political order with transnational processes, it 
is necessary to see how the institutions of the British political economy have 
been historically globalised. The role that recent British governments have 
played in macro-engineering a liberalised global economic order can be 
viewed as consistent with a liberal political economic heritage that can be 
traced back to Britain’s position as a hegemonic imperial power. The 
remainder of the paper identifies the distinctiveness of the ‘British model’ 
and how it articulates with, and within, the EC/EU.  
 
From the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain controlled world money 
and global investment under the banner of free trade. This placed financial 
capital interests and three interconnected institutions at the centre of British 
 9 
governance, and therefore, global power: the City of London, the Bank of 
England and the Treasury (Ingham 1984). This institutional nexus protected 
the interests of global financial capital against more modernised forms of 
state regulation and control. The role of the ‘official’ state institution in this 
relationship, the Treasury, was to ensure the business of financial capital 
was not unduly restricted by formal government activities. The Treasury’s 
capacity to maintain a liberal orthodoxy within the British state has been 
remarkably continuous (see Cain 1997: 97-98).  Burn (1999: 251), drawing 
on the example of the Eurodollar markets, describes the relationship 
between state and civil society in Britain as a blurred one in which the Bank 
of England and City operate as a form of ‘private interest government’. It 
implied a more direct relationship between the British state and global 
capital than in more typical nation-states. A flexible, financially-driven 
model of capitalism was therefore embedded in the British political 
economy long before contemporary discourses of globalisation.  
 
It was the success of the protectionist counter-movement, particularly in 
Germany and the USA, which signalled the end of British world power and 
free trade imperialism (Arrighi and Silver 2003: 337). Notably, the rise to 
world power of the USA was based on only a partial trade liberalisation and 
its ‘self-centred, largely self-sufficient, continent sized economy’ (ibid: 
339). By the 1930s the era of a British dominated world economy was 
clearly at an end. Britain had been forced to abandon the gold standard and 
adopted protectionism in the form of an imperial preference system. 
Nevertheless, key British elites remained committed to a return to the ‘one-
world system’ and economic liberalism (Strange 1967; Overbeek 1990; 
Milward and Brennan 1996). Despite a system of Commonwealth trade 
preferences and import controls in Britain, the overriding objectives of 
British governments during the 1950s were commercial and monetary 
policies based on global free trade principles. Governments believed that 
Britain could once again place itself at the centre of a liberal global 
economy because of its Commonwealth ties, its strong relationships with 
both Europe and the US, and the continued importance of sterling and the 
City to the world economy. Notably, from 1953 onwards Britain pursued 
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through the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) a 
liberalisation policy centred on currency convertibility and the abolition of 
all controls and trade discrimination3 (Milward and Brennan 1996). There 
was a continued commitment to sterling as a reserve currency which was 
not only viewed as essential to revive the City of London’s role as a 
financial centre but also reinforced a financial conjunction of interests 
between Britain and the US (Schenk 2002). Britain was to re-assert its place 
in the global economy through placing itself at the centre of an integrated 
transatlantic economy. As part of this, British governments also ensured 
easy access of American investment to Britain and Europe. While Britain 
retained import controls on American goods, the post-war American 
penetration of the British economy was evident in the scale of American 
investment that increased by 151% between 1950 and 1958 (Overbeek 
1990: 105).  
 
The plans for an integrated European customs union with ambitions of 
political unity represented a clear threat to the British vision. It was viewed 
as another step in the direction of establishing a global economy based on 
exclusive protectionist blocs. British governments were concerned to restrict 
the consolidation of Europe and North America into distinct regional blocs 
of economic power. The first significant British response to European 
integration was to propose a European Free Trade Area (EFTA) that lacked 
the more extensive system of obligations and commitments of the EC. The 
six member-states of the EC were highly suspicious of a proposal that 
would have effectively permitted low cost imports from around the world to 
penetrate the common market, many entering undetected though Britain’s 
commonwealth markets (Milward 2002: 268-269). The Macmillan 
Government (1959-1963) only began to pursue EC entry when it became 
clear that EFTA was not a serious alternative to a European customs union 
and that core British commercial interests lay in membership. Nevertheless, 
in so doing Britain was also carving out for itself a particular role within the 
EC/EU that would be more favourable to US interests and keep the 
Community from becoming an ‘inward looking club’ (Kaiser 1996: 130). 
Indeed, it seems that the same reasons against British EC membership 
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became transformed into the rationale for membership from about the late 
1950s onwards. This raised significant problems for the achievement of 
British membership during the 1960s. Moravscik argues that the key factor 
behind de Gaulle’s veto of British membership in 1963, was the concern 
that Britain would undermine the protection obtained for French agriculture 
in the CAP (1999: 190-195). It was likely that in GATT negotiations the 
British would have been sympathetic to the US objective of reducing 
European agricultural protection (ibid: 208). Britain appeared reluctant to 
have accepted any commercial framework that would continue 
discrimination against North America despite being more favourable to the 
CAP as a way of reducing the cost to the Treasury of supporting British 
farming. De Gaulle consistently, and correctly, viewed the British EC 
membership as a threat on the ‘accepted economic purpose and rules of the 
Community, to create a regional discriminatory trade bloc’ (Milward 2002: 
481).  In addition, Schenk (2002) has shown that the role of sterling as an 
international currency was a significant obstacle in the way of British EC 
membership during the 1960s because it was feared that the EC would be 
called upon to bail out Britain when it faced another sterling crisis. There 
were therefore significant politico-economic barriers to British membership 
of the EC despite growing support amongst the six member-states.  British 
membership of the EC did not become a serious possibility until the end of 
the 1960s when the Wilson Government laid the groundwork for entry. 
Membership is usually associated with the fall from power of de Gaulle; 
however it was as much to do with changes in the political economic 
environment. For instance, the growing willingness of the member-states to 
move towards greater trade liberalisation with the US removed a potential 
source of conflict between Britain and the EC/EU. In addition, the problems 
with sterling seemed to have abated after a reduced role for the pound was 
accepted after 1968 and by the breakdown of Bretton Woods in the early 
1970s. 
 
From a domestic viewpoint, British governments’ more ‘global’ approach to 
European membership was also viewed as consistent with strategies of 
economic modernisation. With the declining economic importance of the 
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Commonwealth, Britain was well placed to become an international 
gateway to European markets. The modernising implications of this for the 
domestic economy had much in common with traditional economic policies 
that enforced greater domestic competitiveness through the external 
sanction of free trade (Gamble 1994: 115). The outlook of an intensification 
of European competition for the less advanced sections of the British 
economy were likely to be negative.  Nevertheless, the concern of those, 
particularly on the left, with the negative impact on small and medium sized 
British business was largely ignored by governing elites4 and membership 
of the EC was trumpeted as a liberal measure opening up British markets to 
competitive pressures that would force business to rationalise. The 
commercial pressure exerted on British governments to pursue membership 
came particularly from large-scale capital suggesting that the policy was 
firmly in line with the multinationalisation5 of the British economy and with 
securing Britain’s role as a global financial centre.  
 
Membership of the EC was part of rather than the solution to the structural 
contradictions and crisis that characterised the British post-war political 
economy. The commitment to the value of sterling as a top international 
reserve currency and a relatively open economy had compromised any 
restructuring of the British industrial base.  A combination of high interest 
rates and deflationary strategies to defend against currency speculation, 
alongside surges of imports once the economy began to revive, created an 
environment in which domestic industries struggled. By the time the Heath 
Government finally signed the Treaty of Rome in January 1973, the 
problems of the British economy had become particularly acute and 
membership became the ‘essential instrument’ for achieving a degree of 
unity across the political class (Nairn 1973: 36). Membership was 
eventually achieved against the background of an unsustainable expansion 
of the economy, that resulted in a balance of payments crisis for the 
incoming Labour Government, and growing trade union militancy due to 
the failure of the Government to secure trade union reform and wage 
restraint.  Nairn at the time argued that EC membership ‘and it alone, 
offered the way out from the pitfalls which seemed to dominate the political 
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landscape of 1970’ (ibid; also see Jessop 1980: 71-72). It is essential to 
emphasise the active support for membership of financial capital in the 
context of the dollar crisis and worsening domestic economic conditions 
(Nairn 1973: 20-27). British entry to the EC under the Heath Government 
was highly compromised, it was the only part of its political project left 
intact and had de facto been reduced to an aspect of crisis management 
designed to reassure international capital. 
 14 
Membership of the EC/EU and the consolidation of Britain’s global 
political economy 
 
Membership of the EC had signalled a partial reorientation of Britain’s 
political economy, however this did not result in the transformation of 
Britain into a more typical national industrial power. British political 
economy remained global in outlook despite the end of the one-world 
system envisaged by British policy makers in the 1950s, as the sterling area 
declined and Bretton Woods collapsed. The re-emergence of the City on the 
back of the Eurodollar markets and the dominance of multinationals 
continued to bolster the established institutions of British economic 
governance. This was evident in the Labour Government’s decision in 1976 
to apply for a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to stem a 
sterling crisis which brought about a reversal of electoral pledges on public 
spending and the introduction of policies centred on price stability and 
private investment. The IMF operating in alliance with the City-Bank-
Treasury nexus attacked the forces of economic-corporatism in Britain and 
brought about a recomposition of British social relations (Jessop 1980: 81-
82). In adopting neo-liberal policies, Panitch argues that the Labour 
Government were not simply ‘managing the British crisis’ but ‘explicitly 
saw themselves as junior partners with the US in managing the international 
crisis, through policies to accelerate the free flow of capital’ (2000: 13). In 
this context, the Labour Government was fully prepared to accept the 
globalisation of the domestic policy regime. Furthermore, this revived 
global and Atlanticist approach to economic management was being 
prioritised over European plans for monetary cooperation on which the 
British position was extremely cautious and at some points characterised by 
outright hostility (Jenkins 1991: 441-446).   
 
Rather than viewing the British political economy as restructured by US 
hegemonic policies in the 1970s, it is more appropriate to see British elites 
as taking advantage of a structural context favourable to the historical 
organisation of British capitalist interests. Both in terms of outward and 
inward foreign investment, Britain benefited from the deregulation of 
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capital markets initiated by the United States and the expansionist fiscal 
policy of the early Reagan era. Gamble argues that the recovery in the 
British economy between 1981-1987 was fuelled by the budget and trade 
deficits of the United States that followed from this policy shift (1988: 98). 
Of course it was the Thatcher governments of the 1980s that radically set 
about restoring global capitalist accumulation in Britain by removing the 
interference of a state that was no longer trusted by business and commerce 
(Leys 1990). A large part of the British manufacturing base was not saved 
from collapse, unemployment was allowed to rise and organised labour was 
attacked.  The barriers between the British economy and the global market 
place, such as capital controls, were removed. The upshot was to continue a 
trend whereby Britain’s stock of overseas investments was considerably 
higher than all Western economies, apart from the US, and at the same time 
Britain extended its role as a ‘host country’ for foreign investment and 
multinationals, particularly American and Japanese (Gamble 1988: 20). In 
short, there was a denationalisation of the British economy: 
 
British firms were recognised to be bad at manufacturing, therefore, 
revitalize manufacturing with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
Foreign firms will bring new technology and best management 
practice. The UK would offer a flexible and relatively cheap labour 
force, with few rights or countervailing powers, and also an entré 
into the European Union for Japanese and US firms. Removing 
exchange and capital movement controls would allow British 
financial institutions to export UK capital, and it would allow UK 
financial markets to trade globally. (Hirst and Thompson 2000: 353) 
 
The full implication of this was evident by the mid-1990s when it was clear 
that the British economy was considerably more globalised than its major 
competitors (ibid 2000: 343). An examination of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) shows that these flows had become far more important for the level of 
domestic investment and capital formation than in most other large 
economies. In this respect, Hirst and Thompson claim that ‘it is more like a 
Malaysia or an Indonesia than it is an Italy or even a France’ (ibid: 344).  
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While other countries have had similarly open economies, particularly 
smaller states such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, what distinguishes 
the British case was the extent to which globalisation had emerged as a 
distinctive strategy and ideology. Globalisation in Britain was a political 
project not just an economic reality and it was this project that began to find 
expression in relation to European integration in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
legacy of Thatcherism was to resolve Britain’s post-imperial difficulties by 
fully embedding globalisation within the domestic policy regime.    It was 
not solely the measurable levels of globalisation that made Britain 
distinctive but the existence of these within a relatively large European 
power that explicitly saw itself as a global ideological force. This had major 
implications for Britain’s role in the second wave of European integration.   
 
By the mid-1980s, a global context more favourable to Britain’s political 
economy also included a significant European dimension in the shape of the 
single market project.  The eventual outcome of the negotiations over the 
Single European Act (1986) was viewed as a British victory because of the 
primary focus on market freedoms with few concessions to those who had a 
more institutionalist and federalist agenda  (Thatcher 1993: 555).  This was 
justified in that it was the drive for the free movement of capital put forward 
by Sir Geoffrey Howe that formed the basis of the single market project 
(Gowan 1997:100). The British Government went so far as to trumpet the 
SEA as  ‘Thatcherism on a European scale’ (Young 1998: 333 Howe 1995: 
456). In particular, ministers stressed the benefits that would accrue to the 
City and Britain’s financial service sector in general (Buller 2000: 83-84).  
 
At the time of the single market programme, there appeared to be an 
apparent convergence of economic policy across Europe with that of the 
British Conservative Party, establishing the British Government as a leading 
player in the Community. Wallace and Wallace commented that, 
 
The confidence with which the British Government approached 
these European conversations reflected not only its lost fears of the 
monsters of federalism and corporatism, but also its sense that it was 
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carrying the ideological battle onto the European stage, its policies 
on privatization and deregulation being gradually emulated by its 
continental partners in France, in Spain, even in Germany. (1990: 
98) 
 
In contrast to Britain’s post-war reputation of decline and crisis, the 
Thatcherite restructuring of the state and society began to see Britain 
emerge as model political economy in the context of globalisation.  
However, this was far from straightforward. Despite concerns over the 
intensified global competition, the states of Western Europe continued to 
embed market mechanisms within a diversity of national institutional 
arrangements that can be traced back to earlier phases of political 
modernisation (Crouch 1993; Hollingsworth and Streeck 1994; Crouch and 
Streeck 1997; Grote and Schmitter 1999). In particular, there was no drive 
to dismantle welfare state regimes or the underlying social contracts that 
underpinned them (Alber 1988: 463; Pierson 1991: 173-176; W. Wallace 
1997: 38).  In the early 1990s for many British Eurosceptics, this form of 
regulated capitalism looked like becoming the model for European 
integration that was being pursued by the Delors’ Commission (Ross 1992). 
In support of their ideological objections to further integration, Eurosceptics 
began to emphasise the distinctiveness of the British economy from its 
European counterparts. Out of office, Thatcher articulated this scepticism 
towards the argument that European integration was central to Britain’s 
long-term economic development: 
 
….the European Community’s relative importance as regards both 
world trade and Britain’s global trading opportunities is diminishing 
and will continue to diminish. (1995: 498) 
 
From the perspective of political economy, the chronic factions and splits in 
the Conservative Party during the Major premiership can be seen as 
divisions over the extent to which Britain’s globalised political economy 
could be compatible with the direction of European integration outlined at 
Maastricht. For British Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party, the emerging 
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European institutions of economic governance were not just viewed as 
unnecessary but a serious threat to the British ‘model’ of political economic 
development.  The Major Government claimed that ‘Europe’ could be made 
compatible with Britain and pursued a policy centred on the negotiation of 
exits from key areas such as monetary union and the social dimension in a 
bid to appease hard-line Euroscpetics.   
 
The Major Government further marginalized Britain from the EC/EU 
mainstream. By the mid 1990s, Britain was less a model for other European 
member-states to follow than the ‘“odd man out” among the major 
European economies’ (Hirst and Thompon 2000: 354). Britain’s more open 
and direct relationship to the global market could be contrasted to those 
other Western European states that accommodated globalisation within 
existing national and transnational arrangements. This was reflected in 
policies that involved the re-organisation rather than dismantling of ‘social 
pacts’ and corporatist institutions (Rhodes 1997). It was also evident in the 
capacity of the EU to re-regulate as well as to de-regulate (Majone 1996; 
Walby 1999). European integration involved adjustments to the changing 
macro-economic environment by extensive political and legal 
institutionalisation. For many Western European policy makers, 
globalisation was to be a managed process mediated and shaped by 
transnational institutions that could represent a variety of agents and 
organisations (Wallace 2000: 381). As Helen Wallace notes, 
‘Europeanisation is sufficiently deeply embedded to act as a filter for 
globalisation’6 (ibid: emphasis mine).   
 
If British Conservatives contested the extensive processes of European 
institutionalisation that followed the Single European Act, the election of 
the Labour Government in 1997 committed to a constructive European 
policy implied a new constructive beginning. New Labour committed itself 
not only to fundamental constitutional change in the UK but also to the 
institutions of European governance. The policy review after the election of 
1987 had committed a future Labour Government to a co-operative 
European policy. The 1990s witnessed the Europeanisation of the Labour 
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Party with growing support for the European Union’s economic and social 
agenda (Gamble and Kelly 2000: 3-5). This constructive approach was 
realised when the Blair Government took office and immediately negotiated 
Britain’s incorporation into the Social Chapter. On a number of areas, the 
New Labour Government had placed itself in the mainstream of European 
policy-making and even took on a leadership role in areas such as the 
environment and defence. The implication was that New Labour was 
committed to domestic and European institutional pluralism reflecting a 
shift away from the traditional centralised Westminster system of British 
government. Nevertheless, from a political economy perspective this more 
constructive approach on Europe did not represent a fundamental shift away 
from a liberalisation agenda (see Callaghan 2000: 126-127). It was clear that 
on entering office New Labour were not about to pursue a more European 
form of stakeholder capitalism that would have implied bolstering the 
collective power of the European Union in the face of globalisation. While 
signing up to the Social Chapter at Amsterdam, the Blair Government 
rejected French plans for interventionist policies on growth and 
employment. Moreover, further measures under the Social Chapter were 
rejected as was any extension of Qualified Majority Voting to social policy. 
By the Lisbon Summit of March 2000, the Labour Government was leading 
the agenda for European economic liberalisation in the face of French 
opposition (Black The Guardian 25th March 2000). The Lisbon agreement 
signalled the end of any attempt to renew the Delors’ vision of a more 
interventionist European Union in terms of growth and employment. At the 
summit’s conclusion Blair claimed that ‘there is now a new direction for 
Europe, away from the social regulation agenda of the 80s and instead a 
direction of enterprise, innovation, competition and employment’ (ibid). 
This consolidated a British approach to European integration that had as its 
main priority the liberalisation of the European single market.  This position 
was restated in British government documents on the IGC discussing the 
European constitution (Fella 2005: 14).  
 
While there has been convergence towards a more flexible and liberal 
economic agenda in the European Union, this does not necessarily imply a 
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common approach or understanding of globalisation (Hay, Watson and 
Wincott 1999: Hay and Rosamund 2001). The Labour Government has 
established a distinctive British approach to globalisation in a European 
context of diverse and competing constructions that reflect different national 
ideologies and institutions. From the perspective of this paper, this is a re-
articulation of the British belief in the desirability of an open global 
economy and that any European project should be subordinated to this 
wider goal.  A key dimension of this is the emphasis on the inevitable logic 
of globalisation and the necessity of domestic accommodation (Hay and 
Rosamund 2001: 7; Watson and Hay 2002: 295-300). Watson and Hay 
(2002) claim that the adoption by New Labour of a political project that 
ascribed a logic of necessity to globalisation was primarily motivated by 
electoral interests. The Labour Party’s full-scale adoption of the rhetoric of 
the business model of globalisation was not, they argue, based on a 
structural reality but designed to legitimise their increasingly orthodox 
policies of macroeconomic management. However, this is based on a 
sceptical view of globalisation which is not borne out by what Hirst and 
Thompson have identified as the ‘peculiarities of the British economy’ that 
relates to the high level of integration of Britain into the global economy 
(2000: 354). This is particularly evident in the continued centrality of global 
finance to the British political economy. The overall size of the financial 
services of the UK means that it is the largest industry in terms of  
employment and accounted for approximately one-fifth of total employment 
in 2000 (Centre for Economics and Business Research 2001: 6-14 cited in 
Luo 2003: 6).  It is also distinctively global in character. The penetration of 
the City by American investment banks after deregulation was announced in 
1983 dramatically changed the character of the City which resulted in the 
‘death of gentlemanly capitalism’ (see Ingham 2002: 155-157). This has 
been referred to as the ‘Wimbledonisation’ of the City as it increasingly acts 
as UK host for foreign owned companies (Kynaston 2001). A great bulk of 
the business that occurs in the City serves non-UK residents, for example 
seventy per cent of world transactions in secondary bond markets take place 
in London (International Services London 2001 cited in Luo 2003: 4).  
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The UK economy is driven by trading and financial activity rather than 
manufacturing and production and this means domination by business 
activities whose primary service is to maximise economic flexibility by 
transferring and selling financial assets across the globe. This has profound 
implications for Britain’s political economy. The revived strength of 
financial capital in the British economy fostered by the institutionalised 
subordination of the formal state to these interests implies the continuation 
of a direct relationship between British governments and global market 
forces that is not typical of other European countries. The resistance that 
British governments have shown to embedding themselves within forms of 
European economic governance follows on from this. A major concern 
regarding further integration into Europe is that the flexible and globalised 
British economy would be propelled into a European regulatory regime7.  In 
contrast, the decision to give control over interest rates to the Bank of 
England can be seen as a move in favour of a direct relationship to the 
institutions of global finance over those of European monetary policy.  The 
ambivalence of the Labour Government towards further integration into 
Europe reflects an underlying politico-economic consensus in favour of a 
flexible financially driven global market over a productive regional 
economy. In this context, while there remains a significant fear of exclusion 
from further European integration and the current government remains 
committed to constructive engagement in the European Union, the main 
strategy is to emphasise Britain’s difference from Europe. Consequently, 
policy reflects the ambition of making the EU more like Britain, as the 
British Chancellor has made clear: 
 
..a consensus can be built in Britain and Europe for a new vision for 
Europe: that, as a trading bloc, Europe is superseded by the Europe 
of the global era, Europe’s institutions are having to be reshaped in 
line with long-held British values – internationalism, enterprise, 
fairness, political accountability.’ (Gordon Brown 2003)  
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Conclusion 
 
In exploring Britain’s relationship to European integration from the 
viewpoint of its global-national economy, this paper has brought to the 
surface chronic features and structural conflicts in the political economy of 
this relationship.  The globalisation of Britain cannot be accounted for in 
terms of external force but is the product of the interplay between an 
institutional heritage, active policy decisions, and the changing structure of 
opportunities within the wider global political economy. In the immediate 
post-imperial period, British European policy was directly affected by the 
pursuit of an integrated transatlantic political economy and the structural 
position of global financial interests in the state. More recent developments 
have re-asserted Britain’s global trajectory albeit in new directions, and seen 
the assertion of the British ‘model’ within the European Union. However, 
the globalisation of Britain has to be fully contextualised and cannot be 
generalised as part of a pattern that has been occurring across the European 
Union. Sceptics are correct to point to the failure of general narratives of 
globalisation to explain developments in specific European countries. 
Interestingly, it is in the new accession countries where there has been an 
extensive and quite dramatic opening up of economies to global capital that 
the parallels with the British case are most evident8. Nevertheless, these 
economies are far smaller than Britain’s and are not global centres of 
commercial activity. Other countries have successfully adapted to 
intensified global competition through a careful liberal re-organisation of 
their politico-economic settlements. These countries, such as Sweden, 
remain primarily productivist in outlook and contrast markedly to Britain 
with its chronically large trade deficits and poor productivity levels. A 
revived Scandinavian social model may be particularly important for the 
future of the EU and may provide an important benchmark for those 
economies in and out of the Eurozone which remain stuck with low growth 
and high unemployment.  In contrast, the success of the British political 
economy is highly dependent on a level of inter-penentration of the national 
 23 
and global that is characterised by the dominant role of the City and London 
within domestic, European and global economies. This re-articulation of 
aspects of 19th century free trade imperialism is simply not on offer to the 
political economies of the European Union.  
 
                                                
1 Globalisation is a contested term, however in this paper it refers to the 
active role played by states in deregulating and extending financial and trade 
flows across borders in such a way that new economic relationships are 
formed and relationships between economic and political institutions are 
transformed.  
2 See Poulantzas (1975) ‘Part One: The Internationalisation of Capitalist 
Relations and the Nation-State.’ 
3 This was despite maintaining a system of preferences and discrimination 
for the Commonwealth.  
4 The British Cabinet Minister Richard Crossman’s diary reflections on the 
one-sidedness of a meeting in October 1966 to discuss Britain’s second 
application are pertinent in this respect (Crossman 1979: 260-261).  
5 By 1970 Gamble notes that all 100 of the top British manufacturing 
companies were multinationals (1994: 110) 
6 However, we should note that currently there is considerable uncertainty 
about this ‘embedding process’ demonstrated by the problems of 
legitimating the European project amongst national publics, evident in the 
recent rejections of a European constitution by the French and the Dutch.  
7 This was demonstrated by Gordon Brown’s opposition to a withholding 
tax on cross-border savings because of its impact on the Eurobond market. 
One of the British governments’ five tests before entry into the Euro is 
considered is the impact of membership of the single currency on financial 
services.  
8 See Gowan (1995) on the ‘shock therapy’ model of transition to capitalism 
imposed on post-communist states by American and British governments.  
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